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Abstract 
I document a line of credit channel through which bank liquidity supply shocks affected 
corporate investment during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. By exploiting the 
predetermined variation in the maturity structure of lines of credit, I find that firms whose 
last pre-crisis lines of credit became due at the time of the crisis (treated firms) cut 
investment by more than similar firms whose lines of credit were scheduled to mature after 
the crisis. Moreover, this effect is stronger for financially constrained firms, bank-
dependent firms, and firms whose pre-crisis banks were unhealthy. Within the treated 
group, firms with unhealthy banks were less likely to obtain lines of credit in the crisis than 
those with healthy banks. Finally, in the sample of firms with lines of credit before the 
crisis, I find that those with unhealthy banks experienced lower growth in lines of credit 
and investment, but this effect is restricted only to unrated firms. 
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1     Introduction  
During the 2008–2009 financial crisis, banks suffered large losses caused by mortgage 
delinquencies, and bank lending and corporate investment then declined dramatically. An 
influential view that explains these crisis events holds that a bank credit supply shock 
originating outside of the corporate loan sector forced banks to reduce credit to firms, 
which in turn led to investment cuts and the Great Recession (Brunnermeier, 2009). This 
bank credit supply shock theory justifies the U.S. government’s actions to inject a 
tremendous amount of liquidity to the banking sector during the crisis, such as $700 billion 
Troubled Asset Relief Program. However, some researchers argue that firms voluntarily 
reduced capital expenditure and required less financing because of fewer investment 
opportunities during the recession and that the bank credit supply shock had little impact 
on corporate investment (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). In this paper, I study whether the bank 
credit supply shock can affect corporate investment decisions through a bank line of credit 
channel. 
Firms manage their liquidity mainly through cash and bank lines of credit. 
Literature shows that most firms have lines of credit, which are of similar magnitude to 
cash (Sufi, 2009; Campello et al., 2011).1 Firms also use credit lines to exploit future 
business opportunities (Lins et al., 2010). Hence, if firms lacked access to this important 
source of external liquidity during the crisis, then they might be forced to abandon some 
                                                          
1 Sufi (2009) documents that 81.7% of firm-years have lines of credit for all the public firms in Compustat 
from 1996 through 2003. He also finds that the average lines of credit to assets ratio is 16% and that lines of 
credit to cash is about 1 to 1. 
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investment opportunities. Therefore, it is likely that the bank credit supply shock can be 
transmitted to firms through a line of credit channel. 
I employ two empirical strategies to examine the role of credit line in transmitting 
the bank credit supply shock to the economy. In the first strategy, I exploit the 
predetermined variation in the maturity structure of pre-crisis credit lines to investigate 
whether firms that happened to have credit lines maturing at the time of the crisis performed 
differently from firms whose credit lines were scheduled to mature after the crisis. If the 
bank credit supply shock affected corporate investment, then firms with credit lines 
maturing at the time of the crisis should face more severe liquidity pressures than otherwise 
similar firms with credit lines maturing after the crisis, because the former group of firms 
had strong need to renew their credit lines at a time of greater banking fragility. As a result, 
firms’ inability to obtain liquidity on demand might lead to a fall in investment if other 
sources of financing were also costly. In contrast, the demand shock story predicts that 
both groups should share similar investment trends because they were facing the same 
investment opportunities during the crisis. 
More specifically, the first approach uses the Abadie and Imbens (2011) matching 
estimator of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). First, based on the 
information available before the crisis, I separate the sample into two groups: firms whose 
last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled to mature at the time of the crisis (treated group) 
and firms whose last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled to mature after the crisis (non-
treated group). Then, from the non-treated group, I employ the matching estimator to select 
control firms that were closest to treated firms and compare the change in average quarterly 
investment between the period from October 2006 to June 2007 (the normal period) and 
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the period from October 2008 to June 2009 (the crisis period) across treated and control 
firms.2 In the baseline matching, I match firms based on size, cash flow, cash, market-to-
book ratio, leverage, investment, industry, and credit ratings, all measured in 2006.3 
I find that the maturity structure of pre-crisis credit lines has an economically large 
effect on crisis investment. The baseline result shows that treated firms reduced their 
average quarterly investment by 0.45 percentage point more in the crisis (a 20% lower 
investment rate compared with their pre-crisis investment level) than matched control firms. 
The parallel trends assumption seems to be satisfied because treated and control firms 
exhibited similar investment trends in the pre-crisis period. A placebo test shows that firms 
that had credit lines maturing in the first three quarters of 2007, a non-crisis period, and 
firms that had credit lines maturing after this non-crisis period experienced a similar change 
in investment from Q1-Q3 2006 to Q1-Q3 2007. That is, maturing credit lines in a period 
without bank liquidity shocks does not affect corporate investment. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the view that banks failed to provide enough liquidity to firms in the need 
to renew their credit lines, causing such firms to forgo some investment opportunities. 
The key identification assumption in the matching strategy is that the assignment 
to the treated and non-treated group is exogenous to firm outcome variables, conditional 
on observable firm characteristics. This assumption would be undermined if some smart 
CEOs might have predicted the 2008 financial crash before the Lehman failure and 
adjusted their credit lines beforehand. However, it is unlikely that firms could have 
anticipated the timing and magnitude of the crisis, because even the Federal Reserve failed 
                                                          
2 I follow the definition of the normal period and the crisis period in Chodorow-Reich (2014). 
3 I follow the control variables in Almeida et al. (2011) and Kahle and Stulz (2013). 
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to predict the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression, not to mention the 
industrial firms that did not specialize in the subprime mortgage market. To alleviate the 
concern of self-selection problem, I examine the maturity structure of credit lines that were 
originated prior to the end of 2006, a normal time period when firms were less likely to 
have anticipated the financial turmoil in late 2008.4 Based on this information set in 2006, 
treated firms are defined as those whose last pre-2006 credit lines were scheduled to mature 
in the crisis, whereas non-treated firms are those whose last pre-2006 credit lines were 
scheduled to mature out of the crisis period. I still find that firms in the need to renew their 
credit lines at the time of the crisis reduced investment by more. The matching estimate of 
the ATT (−0.37) is slightly smaller than that in the baseline matching (−0.45) but is still 
statistically significant, which is not surprising given a larger measurement error of 
maturing credit lines.  
I conduct a series of robustness tests and consistently find similar results. First, I 
document that the matching results are robust to the choice of control variables. Second, I 
find some evidence that the larger amount of credit lines that became mature in the crisis, 
the bigger impact of maturing credit lines. Compared with the baseline ATT estimate of –
0.45 percentage point, firms with maturing credit lines over assets ratio greater than 5%, 
10%, and 15% reduced their investment by –0.51, –0.60, and –0.74 percentage point, 
respectively. Third, I show that maturing credit lines is not a proxy for maturing long-term 
debt that is shown to affect crisis investment in Almeida et al. (2011), because the matching 
results remain unchanged when matching additionally on long-term debt due at the time of 
                                                          
4 The average household debt default rate was around 3.3% in 2006, similar to the previous five years. Banks 
also functioned normally in 2006. 
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the crisis. Fourth, the results barely change when the number of control firms goes from 
one to four. Last, regression tests in the sample of treated and control firms yield similar 
results. 
I next examine whether the effect of maturing credit lines varies with firms’ 
financial constraint levels. If the bank credit supply shock story explains the investment 
decline in the crisis, then firms that were ex ante financially constrained or bank-dependent 
should be more adversely affected by maturing credit lines in the crisis because it was more 
costly for these firms to raise external finance. Consistent with this prediction, I find that 
financially constrained firms (high leverage, non-dividend payer, low payout ratio, high 
Kaplan-Zingales index, and high industry-level external finance dependence) and bank-
dependent firms are more severely affected by maturing credit lines in the crisis. 
Furthermore, I test whether the health of pre-crisis banks matters. If the bank credit 
supply shock affected corporate investment and banking relationships were sticky enough 
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014), then treated firms that were attached to unhealthy banks in the 
pre-crisis period should be more adversely affected by expiring credit lines than those that 
borrowed from healthy banks. I find that the effect of maturing credit lines is stronger for 
firms that borrowed pre-crisis credit lines from banks that were in greater distress during 
the crisis: those that reduced loans or had greater exposure to mortgage-backed securities 
more than the average bank. Further analysis shows that treated firms whose pre-crisis 
credit lines were from unhealthy banks were less likely to obtain bank lines of credit during 
the crisis. Therefore, bank lines of credit play an important role in transmitting the bank 
credit supply shock to firms. 
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I also examine how firms adjusted their cash policy and other real corporate 
decisions. I find that treated firms hoarded more cash. Notably, the saved cash (ATT=2.12 
percentage points) is of similar magnitude to annual investment cuts (ATT=–0.45×4=–1.80 
percentage points), suggesting that firms substituted cash for investment when banks were 
unable to renew credit lines. This is consistent with the survey evidence in Campello et al. 
(2011) who find that firms appear to replace investment by cash at low levels of credit lines. 
As for other real variables, I find that treated firms did not adjust their employment or 
technology spending. 
To sum up, I interpret the matching results as follows. When firms’ credit lines 
happened to mature in the crisis, firms suffered an insufficient supply of bank liquidity and 
consequently were forced to cut investment. Consistent with the bank credit supply shock 
story, this effect is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, bank-dependent 
firms, and firms that borrowed pre-crisis credit lines from unhealthy banks. Notably, 
treated firms that were attached to unhealthy banks in the pre-crisis period were less likely 
to obtain bank liquidity in the crisis. The results indicate that the bank credit supply shock 
is transmitted to firms through a line of credit channel. 
The second part of this paper examines whether the bank credit supply shock 
affected corporate liquidity and investment for more general firms irrespective of whether 
their credit lines were scheduled to mature in the crisis. I follow the empirical strategy in 
Chodorow-Reich (2014) to relate bank health to corporate liquidity growth and investment 
growth in the crisis.5  
                                                          
5 Chodorow-Reich (2014) studies the effect of bank credit supply on employment during the crisis. 
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The key identification assumption in the second strategy is that conditional on 
observable characteristics, bank health is uncorrelated with the unobserved credit demand 
shock that might affect liquidity and investment growth. The fact that the 2008–2009 
financial crisis originated outside of banks’ corporate loan portfolios makes it suitable to 
disentangle the credit supply effect from the demand effect. In the formal tests, I employ 
the within-firm estimator to justify the exogeneity of the bank health measure. More 
specifically, I show that, for the subset of firms that originate lines of credit in both the pre-
crisis and crisis periods, the effect of bank health on firm-bank level liquidity growth is the 
same in regressions with and without firm fixed effects, which would not hold if the 
unobserved credit demand shock is correlated with bank health. 
The results of the second strategy are as follows. First, the loan-level regressions 
show that for the same firms receiving credit lines from at least two banks in the pre-crisis 
period, they received more credit lines in the crisis from healthy banks than from unhealthy 
banks. Such loan-level tests fully control for changes in investment opportunities at the 
firm level. Second, firm-level regressions indicate that bank health has a large, positive 
effect on firms’ credit lines growth and investment growth. In the baseline OLS regression, 
a one standard deviation increase in bank health boosts investment by 8.2%. Third, the 
effects of bank health on the growth of credit lines and investment are restricted only to 
unrated firms. Last, firms with healthy banks had a higher ratio of credit lines to cash during 
the crisis. In other words, bank health affects firms’ choice of external liquidity lines of 
credit and internal liquidity cash. Overall, the results of both empirical strategies highlight 
a line of credit channel through which the bank credit supply shock is transmitted to firms.  
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This paper is closely related to the recent literature that examines the impact of the 
2008 financial crisis on U.S. firms’ financial policies and investment. Kahle and Stulz 
(2013) argue for a demand shock story based on their finding that bank-dependent firms 
had similar investment trends to non-dependent firms. However, most firms have credit 
lines (Sufi, 2009), and about 90% of credit lines were scheduled to mature after the crisis 
(Chodorow-Reich and Falato, 2018).6 Hence, most firms could potentially draw down their 
pre-crisis credit lines to withstand bad times. This might explain why bank-dependent firms 
were shielded against the bank credit supply shock. Almeida et al. (2011) show that the 
maturity structure of long-term debt has a causal effect on firm investment in the crisis. 
However, their results do not point out whether or not the effect is due to a bank credit 
supply shock. Existing literature also documents the increased drawdown behavior of firms 
in the crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Campello et al., 2010), but they do not 
quantify the effect of credit lines on investment. Campello et al. (2011) examine the 
connection between liquidity management and pro forma planned investment based on 
survey data, but they do not argue for a bank credit supply shock story. My focus on lines 
of credit directly traces the effect of firm outcomes to the bank liquidity supply side, and I 
employ the predetermined maturity structure of credit lines to establish a causal relation 
between credit lines and investment. Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2018) study how bank 
health is transmitted to firms whose loans mature after the crisis. My paper complements 
their work in that I focus on the firms that are excluded in their paper—that is, firms that 
                                                          
6 Based on supervisory data (Shared National Credit), Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2018) find that only 10% 
of bank loans have a remaining maturity of less than one year at the time of the crisis; the remaining 90% of 
bank loans mature after one year. 
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have credit lines due at the time of the crisis—and I document a line of credit through 
which the bank credit supply shock is transmitted to these firms. 
This article is also related to a strand of literature that examines firms’ choice 
between cash and lines of credit (Sufi, 2009; Yun, 2009; Acharya et al., 2013). All these 
papers look at how the characteristics of firms affect their corporate liquidity. This paper 
is the first to show that bank credit supply shocks can affect firms’ choice of cash and lines 
of credit, which supports the prediction in Acharya et al. (2013). 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
variable definitions. Section 3 introduces the matching strategy and shows the impact of 
the maturing credit lines on investment. The results on heterogeneous effects by financial 
constraints and bank health are also presented. Section 4 uses loan- and firm-level 
regressions to study the effect of bank health on corporate liquidity growth, investment 
growth, and corporate liquidity choices. Section 5 concludes. 
2     Data  
I begin with the loan-level data from Dealscan, which has detailed loan origination data 
such as loan start date, end date, loan amount, and lenders data. I use such information to 
identify whether firms have credit lines maturing in the crisis and to construct bank health 
measure. I clean Dealscan data mainly following Chodorow-Reich (2014). I include all the 
loans originated in the U.S. and made to the U.S. firms. I also require that at least one of a 
loan’s lead lenders is from the 43 most active lenders in Chodorow-Reich (2014).7 Based 
                                                          
7 Follow Chodorow-Reich (2014), I exclude facilities whose lead lenders only made a small number of 
loans during the sample period, so that I can have a small measurement error of bank health based on the 
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on these loan origination data, I construct a bank health measure in equation (1) as defined 
later.  
Based on Dealscan, I obtain the loan start date of a firm’s last pre-crisis syndication 
and the information on whether that syndication includes lines of credit. I choose all the 
firms whose last pre-crisis syndication includes lines of credit. The main reasons to exclude 
term loans are that they are increasingly provided by non-bank financial institutions such 
as insurance companies, private equity firms, and hedge funds, and that they are more likely 
to be sold by banks. It is possible that firms may have refinanced these term loans, for 
example, by issuing bonds, before they become mature. Therefore, it is harder to know 
whether firms have term loans maturing in a certain period. But for credit lines, most 
lenders are commercial banks and these lines are much less likely to be sold by banks, so 
the maturity structure information is of higher quality. Another reason to focus on credit 
lines is that firms normally draw down only a small portion of total credit lines, whereas 
term loans are often fully drawn down when loans start.8  Therefore, when the crisis 
happened, firms that borrowed credit lines in the pre-crisis period could potentially draw 
down their credit lines, whereas firms that borrowed term loans in the pre-crisis period 
could not further tap liquidity from these loans. In other words, a pre-crisis line of credit 
could potentially serve as a liquidity source during the crisis, but a pre-crisis term loan 
could not. The reason to focus on the last, instead of all the pre-crisis credit lines, is that 
the last credit lines capture the most recent banking relationships, which makes a cleaner 
                                                          
change in the number of loans from the normal period to the crisis period. Like Chodorow-Reich (2014), I 
also find that this restriction reduces the loan-level sample by less than 5%. 
8 On average, firms draw down about one third of total credit lines in the random sample of Sufi (2009). 
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firm-level bank health measure. Based on this Dealscan information, I can determine 
whether firms had last pre-crisis credit lines maturing at the time of the crisis. 
I then merge Dealscan data with firm financials data from Compustat’s North 
America Annual and Quarterly data using the Dealscan-Compustat link table from Chava 
and Roberts (2008). As a result, only public firms are included in the analysis. With the 
financial data, I can construct the following control variables. Cash flow is defined as 
EBITDA (oibdq) over lagged assets (atq). Cash is cash (cheq) divided by lagged assets. 
Size is defined as log of assets. Market-to-book ratio is market value of assets (total assets 
(atq) + market value of equity (cshoq * prccq) – common equity (ceqq) – deferred taxes 
(txdbq))/book value of assets. Leverage is total debt over book assets. Credit ratings data 
are also sourced from Compustat. 
In the matching estimation, the outcome variable is the change in average quarterly 
investment from October 2006 - June 2007 to October 2008 - June 2009. Following 
Chodorow-Reich (2014), I define the crisis period as the three quarters after the Lehman 
bankruptcy, i.e., October 2008 to June 2009, because the TED spread soared to a record 
high level right after the Lehman failure (see Figure 1). Corporate investment is defined as 
quarterly capital expenditures over lagged assets. Similar to Almeida et al. (2011), I drop 
financial firms (SIC 6000s) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4949). I also drop firms with an 
assets growth rate greater than 100% in a single quarter at some point in my sample period. 
Firms with assets less than 10 million at the end of 2006 are also dropped because the 
financials of these small firms are more volatile.9 After applying these restrictions, the final 
                                                          
9 This restriction matters little because the average Dealscan syndicate size is much larger than 10 million, 
so firms with assets less than 10 million normally have no loans in Dealscan. As a result, most small firms 
will be excluded from the final sample based on the requirement of having credit lines from Dealscan. 
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sample includes 1,257 firms that once borrowed credit lines before the crisis, out of which 
991 firms had active credit lines when Lehman collapsed. 
3     The maturity structure of credit lines and firm investment 
In this section, I exploit the preexisting variation in the maturity structure of credit 
lines to investigate whether firms that happened to have credit lines maturing at the time 
of the crisis performed differently from firms whose credit lines were scheduled to mature 
after the crisis. Sufi (2009) shows that firms manage liquidity mainly through cash and 
credit lines. Corporate liquidity decisions are one of the most important decisions for many 
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). To a large extent, they view their job as securing funding 
for investments proposed by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs, see Graham & Harvey, 
2001). If bank liquidity supply shocks affect corporate investment, given the prevalence 
and importance of credit lines in corporate liquidity management, then firms that happened 
to have credit lines maturing at the time of the crisis should face more severe liquidity 
pressures than otherwise similar firms whose credit lines were scheduled to mature after 
the crisis. The former group of firms could not easily replace their credit lines at a time of 
greater banking fragility, but the latter group of firms could potentially draw down their 
pre-crisis credit lines to fund daily operations and investment. As a result, firms’ inability 
to obtain liquidity on demand might lead to a fall in investment if other sources of financing 
were also costly. 
3.1    Abadie-Imbens matching method 
To investigate whether maturing credit lines affects corporate investment, I 
compare the change in investment of firms whose credit lines were predetermined to 
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mature at the time of the crisis with that of similar firms whose credit lines were scheduled 
to mature after the crisis. To implement this comparison, following Almeida et al. (2011) 
and Kahle and Stulz (2013), I employ the Abadie and Imbens matching method (2004). 
This matching approach minimizes the Mahalanobis distance between a vector of 
covariates across treated and non-treated companies and chooses the control firms with a 
minimum distance. A benefit of this approach is that it can produce exact matches over 
categorical variables. Since the matches on continuous variables will not be exact, it 
automatically produces a bias-correction term to account for the differences in continuous 
variables between treated firms and matched control firms. 
In the baseline matching, I use the information right before the Lehman bankruptcy 
(September 15, 2008) to classify firms into treated and non-treated firms. Treated firms are 
those whose last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled to mature at the time of the crisis; 
non-treated firms are those whose last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled to mature after 
the crisis. Then from the non-treated group, I use Abadie-Imbens matching estimator to 
look for control firms that best match treated firms along several dimensions. Following 
Almeida et al. (2011) and Kahle and Stulz (2013), I match on cash flow, cash, size, market-
to-book ratio (or “Q”), leverage, investment, and categorical variables including industry 
and ratings (unrated, junk rated, and investment rated), all measured in 2006. All the 
reported matching results have exact matches on categorical variables. In the end, this 
matching approach provides an Abadie-Imbens estimate of the ATT.  
Based on the matching estimate of the ATT, I can infer whether maturing credit 
lines has an impact on corporate investment. If bank liquidity supply shocks affect 
corporate investment, then treated firms should reduce investment relative to control firms, 
14 
 
which implies a negative ATT estimate. As a comparison, the traditional difference-in-
differences estimate is also reported in some tables. 
For each treated firm, I initially choose one firm from the non-treated group as a 
control firm. Since matching is done with replacement, there may be a fewer number of 
unique control firms. In the robustness tests, I further choose two to four control firms. The 
results are barely changed. 
I also exclude firms with sufficient cash because such firms are less affected 
(Duchin et al., 2010). More specifically, I drop 62 firms with cash ratio greater than 40%. 
This leads to the final sample of 929 firms. My results are similar without this restriction. 
There are 94 treated firms and 835 non-treated firms. The baseline matching results in 88 
unique control firms. As a comparison, in Almeida et al. (2011), there are 86 treated firms 
and 79 unique control firms in their baseline matching.  
3.2    Results 
3.2.1   Baseline matching and placebo test 
Before implementing Abadie-Imbens matching, I first compare the financial characteristics 
of treated and non-treated firms and test if the two groups differ significantly along control 
variables in the normal period. 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the means of financials measured at the end of 
2006 for treated, non-treated, and matched control firms. Panel A shows that on average 
treated firms are smaller, slightly less profitable and more cash-rich than non-treated firms. 
After implementing the Abadie-Imbens matching, Panel B reports that these differences 
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disappear across treated and control firms. The means of the other financial variables Q, 
leverage, and investment are also indistinguishable.  
Table 2 compares the distributions of the financials measured at the end of 2006. 
Panel A shows that before the matching, treated and non-treated firms differ significantly 
in the distributions of size, cash, and leverage. Panel B demonstrates that after the matching, 
treated and control firms are similar in the distributions across all control variables. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that treated firms reduced their average quarterly 
investment from 2.25 percentage points in the normal period (2006:Q4-2007:Q2) to 1.21 
percentage points in the crisis (2008:Q4-2009:Q2), a drop of 1.04 percentage points (or 
1.04/2.25=46% lower investment rate), while non-treated companies cut their investment 
from 1.89 to 1.34, a fall of 0.55 percentage point (or 0.55/1.89=29% lower investment rate). 
This leads to a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimate of –0.49 percentage point (on a 
quarterly basis), which is statistically significant. Therefore, treated firms reduced 
investment by more than non-treated firms. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the main Abadie-Imbens matching results. After the 
matching, the investment of treated firms still experienced a drop of 1.04 percentage points, 
whereas the investment of control firms declined by 0.46 percentage point. As a result, the 
DiD estimate is −0.58 percentage point. The matching estimate of ATT is −0.45 percentage 
point (or 0.45/2.25=20% lower investment rate). Both the DiD and ATT estimates are 
statistically significant. Therefore, treated firms also cut investment by more than matched 
control firms. The ATT estimate is smaller in absolute terms than the DiD estimate because 
it includes a bias-correction term to account for inexact matches on continuous variables. 
In this case, as shown in Panel B of Table 1, the matched control firms are slightly bigger, 
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more profitable, and of higher leverage than treated firms.10 Such firms should experience 
a smaller drop in investment. If control firms were to have similar size, cash flow, and 
leverage to treated firms, then the investment level of control firms in the crisis period 
might be lower, which would lead to a larger differential reduction across treated and 
control firms (that is, a large DiD estimate in absolute terms). 
To examine whether treated firms and control firms follow parallel trends before 
the crisis, I plot the evolution of investment rates in Figure 2. Parallel trends assumption 
seems to be satisfied as treated and control firms exhibited similar investment trends in the 
pre-crisis period. 
A concern is that firms may choose to reduce their investment whenever they have 
maturing credit lines, irrespective of bank liquidity supply shocks. To alleviate this concern, 
I choose a placebo period 2007:Q1-Q3 when bank liquidity supply shocks were absent, 
and I test whether maturing credit lines in this placebo period also affects investment. In 
this placebo test, the pre-placebo period is defined as 2006:Q1-Q3. I measure the maturity 
structure of credit lines at the end of 2006. Treated firms are those whose last pre-placebo 
period credit lines happened to mature in the placebo period 2007:Q1-Q3, and non-treated 
firms are those whose last pre-placebo period credit lines were scheduled to mature after 
2007:Q3. I match on the same set of control variables measured at the end of 2006. Panel 
C of Table 3 reports the matching results. Treated firms and control firms exhibited similar 
investment trends from the pre-placebo period to the placebo period. Both the DiD and the 
ATT estimates are economically small and statistically insignificant, which suggests that 
                                                          
10 Note that differences are statistically insignificant. 
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the maturing credit lines has no impact on firm investment in the absence of bank liquidity 
supply shocks.  
Overall, the results are consistent with the view that banks were unable to provide 
enough liquidity to firms in the need to renew their credit lines during the crisis, causing 
such firms to forgo investment opportunities. 
3.2.2   Predetermined maturity structure tests 
The key identification assumption in the matching strategy is that the assignment 
to the treated and non-treated group is exogenous to firm outcome variables, conditional 
on observable firm characteristics. In the baseline matching, I measure the predetermined 
variation in whether firms had their last pre-crisis credit lines maturing at the time of the 
crisis based on information right before the Lehman bankruptcy (September 15, 2008). 
This is subject to the criticism that some smart CEOs might have predicted the 2008 
financial crash before the Lehman failure and adjusted their credit lines beforehand. 
However, it is unlikely to be case because even the Federal Reserve failed to predict the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, not to mention the industrial firms that 
did not specialize in the subprime mortgage market.  
In the data, the median treated firms originated their last pre-crisis credit lines in 
August 2006, whereas the median control firms received their last pre-crisis credit lines in 
March 2007, both in a normal period.11  Considering that it takes about three months 
between the time a bank approves a term sheet and the time syndication loans start (Murfin, 
                                                          
11 By construction, matched control firms originated their last credit lines later than treated firms, because I 
impose the restriction that non-treated firms had pre-crisis credit lines maturing after the crisis. Such 
restriction naturally pushes facility start date for non-treated firms to a later time. 
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2012), the decisions of both typical treated firms and control firms to obtain their last pre-
crisis credie lines were made in 2006, a normal period in which household debt default rate 
was still low and similar to historical levels (Mian and Sufi, 2016). In other words, it is 
unlikely that typical firms could have anticipated the collapse of subprime mortgage market 
and adjusted their credit lines beforehand. Therefore, the variation in whether firms have 
their pre-crisis credit lines maturing in the crisis is plausibly exogenous. 
Nonetheless, I implement the following test to address the concern that treated 
dummy is not perfectly predetermined. I use the information available at the end of 2006, 
a normal time period when firms were less likely to have anticipated the financial turmoil 
in late 2008, to measure the maturity structure of pre-2006 credit lines. Based on this 
information set, treated firms are defined as those whose last pre-2006 credit lines were 
scheduled to mature in the crisis, whereas non-treated firms are those whose last pre-2006 
credit lines were scheduled to mature out of the crisis period. In other words, I look for 
firms’ last crisis lines originated before the end of 2006, if such credit lines were scheduled 
to mature in the crisis period October 2008 to June 2009, then the corresponding firms are 
assigned to the treated group, regardless of whether these firms amended or refinanced 
such credit lines during the period from January 2007 to September 2008. If firms’ last pre-
2006 credit lines were scheduled to mature out of the crisis period, then such firms are 
assigned to the non-treated group, regardless of whether firms obtained new credit lines 
afterwards that happened to mature at the time of the crisis. This measurement of maturing 
credit lines is noisier but more exogenous than the baseline one using information before 
the Lehman failure. There are 98 treated firms by this definition. 
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Table 4 presents the matching results based on the maturity structure measured in 
2006. I still find some evidence that maturing credit lines has a negative impact on 
investment. The new matching estimate of ATT (−0.37) is slightly smaller than that (−0.45) 
in the baseline matching based on the information before the Lehman failure, which is not 
surprising because the new measure of maturing credit lines using 2006 information is 
noisier. However, the ATT estimate is still statistically significant. The new DiD estimate 
(−0.43) is also slightly smaller than that in the baseline matching (−0.58), but it is only 
marginally significant (p-value=0.119) 
3.2.3   The heterogeneous effect by financial constraints 
I next examine whether the effect of maturing credit lines varies with firms’ financial 
constraints levels. If the bank credit supply shock story explains the investment decline in 
the crisis, then firms that are ex ante more financially constrained or more reliant on 
external financing should be more adversely affected by maturing credit lines, because 
such firms should find it harder to raise external finance. Therefore, within the treated firms 
that had credit lines maturing in the crisis, the investment behaviors of financially 
constrained firms should drive the main matching result. 
To implement the tests, I split the 94 treated firms into two groups based on the 
medians of ex ante financial constraint measures or external financing dependence measure 
in the treated sample. Then I separately match each subgroup to non-treated firms. For 
example, when splitting based on pre-crisis leverage, I first find the median of leverage 
within 94 treated firms. Then all the treated firms below the median leverage will be 
matched to non-treated firms, resulting in an ATT estimate of −0.28 (column 1 row 1 in 
Panel A of Table 5), which is statistically insignificant. Similarly, all the treated firms 
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above the median leverage will also be matched to non-treated firms, leading to an ATT 
estimate of −0.92 (column 1 row 2 in Panel A of Table 5), which is significant at 5% level. 
Therefore, it is highly levered treated firms that drive the main matching results.  
The other financial constraint measures include non-dividend payer, payout ratio, 
Kaplan-Zingale index, and bank dependence, all measured at the end of 2006.12 Non-
dividend payer is equal to one if firms did not pay any dividends in the past three years 
prior to 2006 and zero otherwise. Bank-dependent firms are defined as those that had two 
or more loans from the same U.S. lead lender in the five years before 2006; the rest firms 
form the non-bank dependent group (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). The variable to measure the 
extent to which firms rely on external financing is industry-level external finance 
dependence. Firm-level external finance dependence is defined as the proportion of 
investment not financed by cash flow from operations. Industry-level external finance 
dependence is defined as the industry (SIC2) median of firm-level external finance 
dependence (Duchin et al., 2010). This industry-level variable is less influenced by firm 
choices. Thus, it is more exogenous. 
Table 5 reports the matching results for these financial constraint measures and 
external finance dependence measure. I consistently find that treated firms in the 
financially constrained group (high leverage, non-dividend payer, low payout ratio, high 
Kaplan-Zingales index, and bank-dependent firms) or in the high level of external 
financing dependence group are more adversely affected by maturing credit lines in the 
crisis than treated firms in the financially unconstrained group (low leverage, dividend 
                                                          
12 Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index=−1.002*Cash flow+0.283*Q+3.319*Debt−39.368*Dividends−1.315* 
Cash. Payout ratio=(Cash dividends (dvp+dvc)+repurchases (prstkc))/income before extraordinary items 
(ib). 
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payer, high payout ratio, low Kaplan-Zingales index, non-bank dependent) or in the low 
level of external financing dependence group. In sum, treated firms that were ex ante 
financially constrained were more severely affected by maturing credit lines, consistent 
with the bank credit supply shocks story. 
3.2.4   The heterogeneous effect by bank health 
To more directly examine if the bank liquidity shock affect the corporate investment, I 
exploit the variation in bank health. If the bank liquidity supply story explains the 
differential response of treated and control firms, then treated firms whose pre-crisis banks 
were unhealthy were more likely to be adversely affected by maturing credit lines, because 
such treated firms might be less likely to obtain new bank liquidity in the crisis.  
I measure the bank health in two ways (Chodorow-Reich, 2014). First, I use the 
percentage change in the number of loans to all other borrowers Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏 (see equation (1) 
as shown later). Specifically,  Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏 equals the change in the number of loans made by 
firm 𝑖’s lead bank 𝑏 to all other firms between the periods 2005:10-2006:6 & 2006:10-
2007:6 and the crisis periods 2008:10-2009:6. The lead bank refers to that in the firm’s last 
pre-crisis credit lines. The second measure of bank health is ABX exposure, which is 
defined as the lead bank’s exposure to ABX AAA 2006-H1 index. This index tracks the 
price of residential mortgage-backed securities issued in later 2005 and it had an AAA 
rating at issuance. The ABX exposure is calculated as the loading of a bank’s stock price 
to this index over the period October 2007 to December 2007. I obtain the ABX exposure 
data from Chodorow-Reich’s website. Firm-level measures of Δ𝐿𝑖 (see equation (2)) and 
ABX exposure are the weighted average by bank allocation over the lead banks in the last 
pre-crisis credit lines. 
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The matching procedure is the same as the one in analyzing the heterogeneous 
effects by financial constraints. First, I split the 94 treated firms into two subgroups based 
on the medians of bank health measures. I then match each subgroup to non-treated firms. 
Table 6 presents the results. Column 1 reports that treated firms with unhealthy banks (low 
Δ𝐿𝑖) in the last pre-crisis credit lines were severely affected by maturing credit lines. They 
reduced investment by 0.59 percentage point, but firms with healthy banks (high Δ𝐿𝑖) cut 
investment by 0.35 percentage point. Column 2 shows that treated firms attached to banks 
with a large ABX exposure reduced investment by 0.70 percentage points, which is 
significant at 5% level. However, treated firms attached to banks with a small ABX 
exposure cut investment by a small magnitude of 0.19 percentage points, which is 
statistically insignificant. This result directly traces the investment behaviors of the treated 
firms to the bank credit supply shock caused by “toxic” assets.  
However, the above matching results are subject to criticism of imprecise matching. 
If bank health does affect corporate investment, then the channel through which bank 
health imposes its influence should be through relieving the financial constraints of firms 
with maturing credit lines, potentially by banks providing new liquidity in the crisis to these 
firms. In Table 7, formal regression tests within the 94 treated firms consistently find that 
treated firms that borrowed credit lines from healthy banks in the pre-crisis were also more 
likely to renew their credit lines in the crisis. This further supports that the bank credit 
supply shock is transmitted to firms through a line of credit channel. 
3.3    Robustness tests 
In section 3.2, I already show that 1) parallel trends assumption seems satisfied, 2) the 
results cannot be explained by firms matching the life of credit lines to that of their 
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investment opportunities (see Panel C of Table 3), 3) the results are unchanged when I use 
the more predetermined maturity structure measured in 2006, and 4) maturing credit lines 
has a larger impact on firms that should be more adversely affected by the bank credit 
supply shock. In this section, I further examine whether the baseline matching results are 
robust. The findings are as follows.  
First, the matching results are consistently economically large and statistically 
significant when different selections of control variables are used as reported in Table 8. 
The ATT estimates range from the baseline –0.45 to –0.72 percentage point. 
Second, I find some evidence that the larger amount of credit lines that became 
mature in the crisis, the bigger impact of maturing credit lines. Table 9 shows that 
compared with the baseline ATT estimate of –0.45 percentage point, firms with maturing 
credit lines over assets ratio greater than 5%, 10%, and 15% reduced their investment by –
0.51, –0.60, and –0.74 percentage point, respectively, which are all statistically significant. 
The DiD estimates also follow the similar trends but are statistically weaker. 
Third, one may wonder if maturing credit lines is just a proxy for maturing long-
term debt that affects investment as documented in Almeida et al. (2011). To exclude this 
concern, I match additionally on long-term debt due defined as in Almeida et al. (2011)13, 
the results are still similar.14 Thus, the bank liquidity shock is transmitted to firms through 
a new channel, the credit line channel. 
                                                          
13 I adjust the long-term debt due measure to represent the portion that would become due in 2008 and 
2009. Specifically, it is defined as long-term debt due in year 2 (dd2) plus long-term debt due in year 3 
(dd3) divided by assets, all measured at 2006 fiscal year end. 
14 The ATT estimate is -0.46 percentage point, and the DiD estimate is -0.37, both statistically significant. 
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Fourth, I also confirm that matching on the number of matched controls from one 
to four produces similar results. The results are also unchanged when matching on two-
digit SIC. 
Last, I use regressions to test if the baseline matching results still hold. The answer 
is yes. In the sample of treated and control firms, I regress change in investment on the 
same set of control variables measured at 2006. Treated firms still cut investment by more. 
3.4    Adjustment of cash and other policies 
This section examines how treated firms adjust cash and other policies in response to their 
maturing credit lines. Previous research documents that firms substitute between cash and 
credit lines (Lins et al., 2010; Campello et al., 2011).15 When the best all-around substitute 
for cash holdings matures in the bad times, treated firms may be forced to hoard cash to 
pay for additional expenses that were previously covered by credit lines if they could hardly 
reduce these expenses. 
As shown in column 1 of Table 10, treated firms saved cash by more. The ATT 
estimate of is 2.12 percentage points and statistically significant. In terms of the economic 
magnitude, the saved cash is of similar magnitude to annual investment cuts (ATT=–
0.45×4=–1.80 percentage points), suggesting that firms substituted cash for investment 
when banks were unable to renew credit lines. This is consistent with the survey findings 
in Campello et al. (2011) who find that firms appear to replace investment by cash at low 
levels of credit lines. Column 2 and 3 document that treated firms barely adjusted 
                                                          
15 Campello et al. (2011) find that firms with abundant cash voluntarily choose to have smaller credit lines 
and fewer drawdowns. I show in this section that firms with maturing credit lines in the bad times choose to 
hoard cash. 
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technology spending (R&D) and employment. In the untabulated results, I find that treated 
and control firms also share similar growth in cost of goods sold (COGS), selling, general 
and administrative expense (SG&A), and sales. Taken together, the results suggest that 
firms facing maturing credit lines in a period with disruptions in the banking system chose 
to cut investment and save cash, possibly due to their inability to adjust other policies. 
To sum up, I interpret the matching results as follows. When firms’ pre-crisis bank 
lines of credit matured in the crisis, firms suffered insufficient bank liquidity supply and 
consequently were forced to cut investment. However, financially unconstrained firms and 
firms whose pre-crisis banks were healthy were more likely to obtain credit lines in the 
crisis, and thus were less adversely affected by maturing credit lines. 
4     Bank health, corporate liquidity, and investment  
Previous analysis demonstrates that 94 firms with last pre-crisis credit lines maturing in 
the crisis experienced a large decline of investment relative to control firms, and within 
these treated firms, bank health affects the severity of investment cuts and the availability 
of new credit lines in the crisis. However, it is silent on whether bank health has an impact 
on corporate liquidity and investment for more general firms which did not have credit 
lines maturing in the crisis.  
To answer these questions, I follow the empirical strategy in Chodorow-Reich 
(2014) to relate bank health to corporate liquidity growth and investment growth in the 
crisis. 
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First, I show that, within the sample of firms that originated credit lines in both the pre-
crisis and the crisis periods, bank health is uncorrelated with unobserved credit demand, 
conditional on firm observable characteristics. Thus, bank health is plausibly exogenous. 
Second, I examine the effects of bank health on the growth in lines of credit and investment. 
Third, I show how the effects of bank health varies by firm types. Last, I examine whether 
the bank liquidity supply shock affects the composition of lines of credit and cash. 
4.1    Bank health measure 
Following Chodorow-Reich (2014), I measure bank health using the percentage change in 
the number of loans to all other firms between the normal and the crisis periods. 
Specifically, suppose firm i receives a loan from bank b at time t, then I define 𝐿𝑖,𝑏,𝑡=1. 
The bank health measure is defined as 
equation (1) 
Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏 =
∑ 𝛼𝑗,𝑏,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝐿𝑗,𝑏,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗≠𝑖
0.5 ∑ 𝛼𝑗,𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 × 𝐿𝑗,𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑗≠𝑖
− 1 
where 𝛼 is the bank allocation to denote the importance of that bank to the syndicate. Crisis 
definition is the same as previous analysis, that is, from October 2008 to June 2009. Normal 
period includes October 2005 to June 2006 and October 2006 to June 2007.  
The firm level bank health measure is the weighted average of Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏 over the lead 
lenders of the last pre-crisis syndicate. More specifically, firm’s bank health is 
equation (2) 
Δ𝐿𝑖 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑏,𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 ×
𝑏
Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏 
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where b is a lead lender in the last pre-crisis syndicate; 𝛼 is the bank allocation of 
that lead lender in the last pre-crisis syndicate.  
4.2    Identification 
To investigate whether bank health matters for corporate liquidity and investment, 
I regress the outcome variable (credit lines growth or investment growth) on the firm level 
bank health Δ𝐿𝑖 and a set of financial controls measured at the end of 2006. That is, I run 
the following regression: 
equation (3) 
g𝑖 = 𝛽Δ𝐿𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where g𝑖 is Δlog (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖  or Δlog (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡)𝑖, that is, change in the 
log of outcome variable from the normal period October 2006 to June 2007 to the crisis 
October 2008 to June 2009. Investment is defined as a firm’s total capital expenditures in 
corresponding quarters. Firm controls include size, cash, cash flow, leverage and Q. 
Industry (SIC 2), state, and rating fixed effects are also included. The identification 
assumption is that firm level bank health Δ𝐿𝑖  is orthogonal to the unobserved 
characteristics that affect credit or investment outcomes.  
Like Chodorow-Reich (2014), I also use ABX exposure to instrument firm level 
bank health Δ𝐿𝑖. Similar to the construction of Δ𝐿𝑖, the firm level ABX exposure is defined 
as the weighted average of bank level ABX exposures over the lead lenders of the last pre-
crisis syndicate. 
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4.3    Exogeneity of bank health 
I use firm-bank level data to examine whether bank health is plausibly exogenous. To this 
end, I select only firms that originated credit lines in both the pre-crisis and the crisis 
periods. In addition, I also require that firms’ last pre-crisis credit lines have at least two 
lenders so that firm fixed effects can be included in regression. I then investigate for the 
same firms receiving credit lines liquidity from two different banks in the last pre-crisis 
syndicate, whether they would receive more credit lines in the crisis from healthy banks 
than from unhealthy banks. To fully control for the change in the credit demand, I add the 
firm fixed effect when regressing change in bank-firm level credit lines on bank health 
measure Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏. Since the dependent variable is the change, not the level of firm-bank level 
credit lines, the firm fixed effect fully absorbs both observed and unobserved change in 
credit demand. As a result, this bank-firm level regression provides an unbiased estimation 
of bank health. More specifically, I run the following bank-firm regression: 
equation (4) 
log(1 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑏,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑉𝑖,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) − log(𝛼𝑖,𝑏,𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 × 𝑉𝑖,𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡)
= 𝛽Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑏 
where 𝑉𝑖,𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 is the amount of last credit lines; 𝛼𝑖,𝑏,𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 is the bank 𝑏’s allocation in 
the last pre-crisis credit lines to firm i;  𝛼𝑖,𝑏,𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 × 𝑉𝑖,𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 represents firm’s credit lines from 
bank 𝑏 in the last syndicate; 𝛼𝑖,𝑏,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑉𝑖,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 is firm’s credit lines form bank 𝑏 in the 
crisis credit lines. Since a pre-crisis bank can decline to offer liquidity in the crisis credit 
lines, I add one to the bank’s crisis credit lines 𝛼𝑖,𝑏,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑉𝑖,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  so that log form is 
meaningful. 
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Table 11 reports the results of this firm-bank level regressions using 94 firms that 
have credit lines originations in both the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. Column 1 shows 
the result of regression without firm fixed effects Column 2 adds firm fixed effects. Again, 
since the dependent variable is the change, not the level of liquidity, this firm fixed effects 
fully absorbs any observed and unobserved credit demand change from the normal period 
to the crisis period. Therefore, the coefficient in column 2 can be viewed as an unbiased 
estimate of bank health. Column 3 excludes firm fixed effects and add firm financial 
controls measured in 2006 that potentially affect credit demand. Any unobserved factors 
that could potentially affect change in credit demand are in the error terms. If unobserved 
credit demand correlates with bank health Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏, then one would expect the coefficient of 
bank health to change substantially compared with the coefficient estimate with firm fixed 
effects in column 2. The results in column 1-3 demonstrate that there is little variation in 
the coefficient estimates of bank health. Therefore, I conclude that bank health is 
uncorrelated with unobserved firm characteristics that affect credit demand, conditional on 
observables. The positive coefficient of bank health means that for the same firms receiving 
credit lines from two banks in the pre-crisis credit lines, they receives more credit lines in 
the crisis from healthy banks than from unhealthy banks. In other words, unhealthy banks 
reduced liquidity by more than healthy banks to the same firms. Therefore, the bank 
liquidity shock can be transmitted to firms through less liquidity provisions by unhealthy 
banks. 
4.4    Bank health, liquidity growth, and investment growth 
The next question is whether bank health affects corporate liquidity and investment growth 
in the full sample. Building on the results of exogeneity of bank health in Table 11, I regress 
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outcome variables (corporate liquidity growth and investment growth) on firm level bank 
health Δ𝐿𝑖. The regressions are at the firm level, so I cannot include firm fixed effects. 
Table 12 reports that bank health consistently has a large and statistically significant effect 
on firms credit lines growth. I normalize bank health to have unit variance. Column 2 shows 
that a one standard deviation increase of bank health increases credit lines by 90%. It should 
be noted that the amount of credit lines is not extracted from 10-K or 10-Q, but it is 
constructed by aggregating all the outstanding credit lines from Dealscan at a given point 
in time (Acharya et al., 2013). 
Table 13 presents the main results of the effect of bank liquidity supply on corporate 
investment for the sample of firms that have ever had credit lines in the pre-crisis period. 
Formal regressions consistently show that firms that borrowed from healthy lenders before 
the crisis experienced a higher investment growth than firms that borrowed from unhealthy 
banks. Based on the result of column 2, a one standard deviation (19%) increase of bank 
health Δ𝐿𝑖  makes investment grow by 8.2%. Borrowing from 75th percentile (–16.8%) 
rather than 25th percentile of bank health (–42.9%) results in an investment growth of 11.2% 
((–16.8% + 42.9%) /19% * 8.2%=11.2%).  
Since the firm-level bank health measure is based on the health of last pre-crisis 
syndicate, to alleviate the concern that some firms might have predicted the financial crash 
and adjusted banking relationships beforehand, I use only firms that obtained their last pre-
crisis syndicate before 2006 year end and find similar effects of bank health on the growth 
in credit lines and investment. 
I then examine whether bank health has a heterogenous effect on credit lines and 
investment across firm ratings. Table 14 reports that bank health has an economically large 
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and statistically significant effect on the growth in credit lines and investment for unrated 
firms, but the effect is economically small and statistically insignificant for rated firms, 
especially the effect on investment growth. The results are consistent with Chodorow-
Reich (2014) who shows that bank health has a large impact on unrated firms’ employment 
growth, but no such impact on rated firms. 
4.5    Bank liquidity shocks and corporate liquidity composition 
Last, I analyze whether the bank liquidity shock affected the composition of lines of credit 
and cash. Existing literatures that study the corporate liquidity management almost 
exclusively focus on whether and how certain firm characteristics affect the composition 
of lines of credit and cash. Table 15 column 1-2 demonstrate that firms with healthy banks 
before the crisis increased the proportion of credit lines in their total liquidity (credit lines 
plus cash) relative to those firms attached to unhealthy banks. A one standard deviation of 
increase in Δ𝐿𝑖 (19%) increases the credit lines to total liquidity ratio by 3%. Column 3-4 
show that it is the increase of credit lines that drives the results. Unreported results show 
that bank health has no impact on cash over net assets. 
 Overall, the results from the second empirical strategy also support that the bank 
liquidity shock is transmitted to firms through a line of credit channel. For the firms that 
borrowed credit lines in both the pre-crisis and the crisis periods, healthy banks provided 
more liquidity than unhealthy banks to the same firms. For more general firms that have 
ever had credit lines before the crisis, firms that borrowed from healthy banks in pre-crisis 
have higher growth in credit lines and investment in the crisis. 
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5     Conclusion 
Through the role of an important source of external liquidity—bank lines of credit—I use 
two empirical strategies to study whether bank liquidity supply shocks affected corporate 
investment during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In the first approach, I exploit the 
predetermined variation in the maturity structure of credit lines and find that unlucky firms 
that happened to have credit lines maturing at the time of the crisis reduced investment by 
more than otherwise similar firms whose credit lines were scheduled to mature after the 
crisis. In addition, the effect of maturing credit lines is more pronounced for financially 
constrained firms and bank-dependent firms. Notably, treated firms that borrowed credit 
lines from unhealthy banks in the pre-crisis period were more adversely affected because 
they were less likely to obtain credit lines in the crisis. A battery of robustness tests produce 
similar results. In particular, I show that the results still hold when I measure the maturity 
structure of credit lines in 2006. I also find that firms with maturing credit lines chose to 
save cash rather than to invest, which is consistent with survey evidence that firms 
substituted between credit lines and cash during the crisis (Campello et al., 2011). 
The second approach directly links bank health to corporate liquidity and 
investment. For the firms that obtained credit lines in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods, 
unhealthy banks reduced the liquidity provision by more than healthy banks to the same 
firms. For more general firms that borrowed credit lines in the pre-crisis period, firms that 
borrowed lines from unhealthy banks experienced lower growth in credit lines and 
investment during the crisis. Overall, these findings are consistent with the causal effect of 
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bank credit supply shocks on firm outcomes. Importantly, I document a line of credit 
channel through which bank credit supply shocks are transmitted to firms.  
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Figure 1. TED spread.  
This figure shows the TED spread from January 2007 to December 2009. TED spread is defined as the 
difference between the 3-month interest rates on interbank loans (LIBOR) and 3-month Treasury bills. It is 
an indicator of perceived credit risk in the economy. Shaded area indicates the recession period from 
December 2007 to June 2009. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Figure 2. Investment trends for treated and control firms.  
This figure shows the evolution of investment (unit: percentage point) for treated and control firms resulted 
from the baseline matching. Each point is the average quarterly investment in a three-quarter period across 
all treated firms (red real line), or control firms (blue dashed line). Investment is defined as capital 
expenditures over lagged assets. The treated firms (94 firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit 
lines became due in the crisis October 2008 to June 2009. The non-treated firms are defined as those whose 
last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled to mature after June 2009. Control firms are selected from the non-
treated group based on Abadie-Imbens estimator using matching variables including size, cash flow, cash, Q, 
leverage, investment, 1-digit SIC, and credit ratings, all measured at the end of 2006 (dashed line). 
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Table 1. Pre-crisis financial characteristics of treated, non-treated, and 
control firms 
 Size Cash Flow Cash Q Leverage Investment 
Panel A. Means for treated and non-treated firms in 2006 
Treated 6.693 0.138 0.112 2.016 0.221 0.022 
Non-Treated 7.145 0.153 0.088 1.926 0.235 0.019 
Difference –0.452 –0.015 0.024 0.090 –0.014 0.003 
p-value 0.009 0.135 0.014 0.476 0.540 0.201 
       
Panel B. Means for treated and matched control firms in 2006 
Treated 6.693 0.138 0.112 2.016 0.221 0.022 
Control 6.807 0.145 0.104 1.941 0.216 0.019 
Difference –0.114 –0.007 0.008 0.075 0.005 0.003 
p-value 0.680 0.596 0.577 0.638 0.881 0.521 
 
Notes. This table provides a comparison of the means of financial variables for treated, non-
treated, and matched control firms. The sample consists of 929 firms whose last pre-crisis 
syndicate includes lines of credit. The treated firms (94 firms) are defined as those whose 
last pre-crisis credit lines became due in the crisis October 2008 to June 2009. The non-
treated firms (835 firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines were 
scheduled to mature after June 2009. Matched control firms are selected from the non-treated 
group based on Abadie-Imbens estimator using matching variables including size, cash flow, 
cash, Q, leverage, investment, 1-digit SIC, and credit ratings, all measured at the end of 2006. 
See the main text for variable definitions. P-values of two sample t test are reported. 
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Table 2. Pre-crisis financial distributions of treated, non-treated, and control firms 
 
 
25% Median 75% 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  
Test p-value 
 
Panel A. Treated vs. Non-Treated firms in 2006 
Size Treated 5.258 6.402 8.019 0.004 
 
Non-Treated 6.116 7.117 8.020  
Cash Flow Treated 0.086 0.127 0.186 0.205 
 
Non-Treated 0.102 0.140 0.196  
Cash Treated 0.026 0.084 0.188 0.035 
 
Non-Treated 0.020 0.053 0.133  
Q Treated 1.295 1.679 2.280 0.893 
 
Non-Treated 1.276 1.630 2.220  
Leverage Treated 0.008 0.164 0.352 0.051 
 
Non-Treated 0.093 0.207 0.329  
Investment Treated 0.006 0.010 0.022 0.825 
 
Non-Treated 0.006 0.011 0.021  
      
 
Panel B. Treated vs. Matched control firms in 2006 
Size Treated 5.258 6.402 8.019 0.330 
 
Control 5.455 6.544 7.953  
Cash Flow Treated 0.086 0.127 0.186 0.248 
 
Control 0.096 0.135 0.184  
Cash Treated 0.026 0.084 0.188 0.782 
 
Control 0.023 0.073 0.147  
Q Treated 1.295 1.679 2.280 0.662 
 
Control 1.318 1.654 2.240  
Leverage Treated 0.008 0.164 0.352 0.782 
 
Control 0.047 0.189 0.330  
Investment Treated 0.006 0.010 0.022 0.540 
 
Control 0.006 0.009 0.018  
Notes. This table compares the distributions of financials for treated, non-treated, and control firms. The 
sample consists of 929 firms whose last pre-crisis syndicate includes lines of credit. The treated firms (94 
firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines became due in the crisis October 2008 to June 
2009. The non-treated firms (835 firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled 
to mature after June 2009. Matched control firms are selected from the non-treated group based on Abadie-
Imbens estimator using matching variables including size, cash flow, cash, Q, leverage, investment, 1-digit 
SIC, and credit ratings, all measured at the end of 2006. See the main text for variable definitions. P-values 
of two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions are reported. 
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Table 3. Investment comparison in the crisis and placebo periods  
Panel A: Crisis investment comparison (Treated vs Non-Treated) 
 2006Q4-2007Q2 2007Q4-2008Q2 2008Q4-2009Q2 
 (1) (2) (3) (3)-(1) 
Treated firms 2.25*** 1.93*** 1.21*** –1.04*** 
 (0.33) (0.28) (0.12) (0.26) 
Non-Treated firms 1.89*** 1.83*** 1.34*** –0.55*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) 
Treated - Non-Treated 0.36 0.10 –0.13 –0.49* 
 (0.34) (0.30) (0.13) (0.27) 
     
Panel B: Crisis investment comparison (Treated vs Matched Control) 
 2006Q4-2007Q2 2007Q4-2008Q2 2008Q4-2009Q2 
 (1) (2) (3) (3)-(1) 
Treated firms 2.25*** 1.93*** 1.21*** –1.04*** 
 (0.33) (0.28) (0.12) (0.26) 
Control firms 1.95*** 1.81*** 1.49*** –0.46** 
 (0.33) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19) 
Treated - Control 0.30 0.12 –0.28 –0.58* 
 (0.47) (0.38) (0.24) (0.33) 
Matching estimator   –0.45*** 
(Abadie-Imbens)   (0.17) 
     
Panel C: Placebo period investment comparison (Treated vs Matched Control) 
 2006Q1-Q3 2007Q1-Q3   
 (1) (2) (2)-(1)  
Treated firms 1.42*** 1.53*** 0.11  
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.12)  
Control firms 1.19*** 1.30*** 0.11  
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.08)  
Treated - Control 0.23 0.23 0.00  
 (0.23) (0.26) (0.14)  
Matching estimator  –0.06  
(Abadie-Imbens)  (0.15)  
Notes. Panel A and B compare the average quarterly investment from 2006Q4-2007Q2 (column 1) with that 
from 2008Q4-2009Q2 (column 3). Panel C compares the average quarterly investment from 2006Q1-Q3 
with that from placebo period 2007Q1-Q3. Investment is defined as quarterly capital expenditure over lagged 
assets and is displayed in percentage points (unit: percentage point). In Panel A, treated firms and non-treated 
firms are compared. In Panel B, treated and matched control firms are compared. In Panel A and Panel B, 
the treated firms (94 firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines became due in the crisis 
October 2008 to June 2009. The non-treated firms (835 firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit 
lines were scheduled to mature after June 2009. Matched control firms are selected from the non-treated 
group based on Abadie-Imbens estimator using matching variables including size, cash flow, cash, Q, 
leverage, investment, 1-digit SIC, and credit ratings, all measured at the end of 2006. In Panel C, treated 
firms are defined as those whose last pre-2006 credit lines were scheduled to mature in the placebo period 
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2007Q1-Q3; non-treated firms are defined as those whose last pre-2006 credit lines were scheduled to mature 
after September 2007. Matching is also based on the same set of financial variables measured at the end of 
2006. There are 94 treated firms and 88 unique control firms in Panel B, and 68 treated and 66 unique control 
firms in Panel C. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parenthesis for the Difference-in-
Differences estimates. Heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors are displayed in parenthesis for 
the matching ATT estimates. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Investment comparison based on the predetermined maturity structure measured 
at the end of 2006 
Difference in differences (DiD) –0.43 
 (0.28) 
Matching estimator (Abadie-Imbens) –0.37** 
 (0.18) 
Number of firms in treated 98 
Notes. This table compares change in average quarterly investment from 2006Q4-2007Q2 to 2008Q4-
2009Q2 across treated firms and matched control firms based on the maturity structure information at the 
end of 2006. Treated firms are those whose last pre-2006 credit lines were scheduled to mature in the crisis 
2008Q4-2009Q2, irrespective of whether they amended or refinanced their last pre-2006 credit lines in the 
period between January 2007 and September 2008. Non-treated firms are those whose last pre-2006 credit 
lines were scheduled to mature out of the crisis based on the 2006 information set. Control firms are selected 
from the non-treated group based on Abadie-Imbens estimator using matching variables including size, cash 
flow, cash, Q, leverage, investment, 1-digit SIC, and credit ratings, all measured at the end of 2006. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parenthesis for the difference-in-differences estimates. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents 
significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Investment comparison by financial constraint measures 
Panel A 
 
 Matching estimator  
(Abadie-Imbens) 
# 
 (1)  (2) (3)  treated 
Low leverage –0.28   47 
 (0.25)    
High leverage –0.92**   47 
 (0.36)    
Dividend Payer  –0.29  43 
  (0.22)   
Non-dividend Payer  –0.63**  51 
  (0.27)   
Payout Ratio High   –0.25 47 
   (0.28)  
Payout Ratio Low   –0.94*** 47 
   (0.30)  
 
Panel B 
 
 Matching estimator  
(Abadie-Imbens) 
# 
 (1)  (2) (3)  treated 
Kaplan-Zingales index Low –0.26   47 
 (0.22)    
Kaplan-Zingales index High –0.78***   47 
 (0.26)    
Non-bank dependent  –0.20  38 
  (0.30)   
Bank-Dependent  –0.68***  56 
  (0.24)   
Industry level external finance dependence Low   –0.18 50 
   (0.17)  
Industry level external finance dependence High   –0.73** 44 
   (0.30)  
 
Notes. This table reports the Abadie-Imbens ATT estimates of investment comparison (2006Q4-2007Q2 vs 
2008Q4-2009Q2) by splitting the 94 treated firms into two groups based on the median ex ante financial 
constraint measures of treated firms. For example, when splitting based on leverage, all the treated firms 
below the median leverage of 94 treated sample firms are matched to non-treated firms, the matching estimate 
of ATT for this matching is reported in column 1 row 1; all the treated firms above the median leverage are 
matched to non-treated firms, the corresponding ATT estimate is reported in column 1 row 2 of Panel A. 
Non-dividend payer is the group of firms that did not pay dividend in the past three years prior to 2006; the 
rest firms form the dividend payer group. Payout ratio=(cash dividends 
(dvp+dvc)+repurchases(prstkc))/income before extraordinary items (ib). Kaplan-Zingales index= –
1.002*cash flow+0.283*Q + 3.319*debt–39.368*Dividends–1.315*cash. Bank-dependent firms are defined 
as those that had two or more loans with the same US lead lender in the five years before 2006 (Khale and 
Stulz, 2010); the rest firms form the non-bank dependent firms. Firm level external finance dependence is 
the proportion of investment not financed by cash flow from operations, which is (capital expenditures (capx) 
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–funds from operations (fopt))/capital expenditures (capx). Industry level external finance dependence is the 
SIC2-median of firm level external finance dependence. The low and high subsamples consist of firms with 
each measure above and below the median. Heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors are displayed 
in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Investment comparison by bank health 
 Matching estimator  
number of treated 
 firms by type 
  (1) (2)   
%Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) High –0.35* 
 47 
 (0.18)   
%Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) Low –0.59** 
 47 
 (0.29)   
Small ABX exposure  –0.19 47 
 
 (0.17) 
 
Large ABX exposure  –0.70** 47 
    (0.32)   
Notes. This table reports the Abadie-Imbens ATT estimates of investment comparison (2006Q4-2007Q2 vs 
2008Q4-2009Q2) by splitting the 94 treated firms into two groups based on the median of bank health 
measures. For example, when splitting based on the ABX exposure, all the treated firms below the median 
will be matched to the non-treated firms, the ATT estimate for this matching is reported in column 2 row 3; 
all the treated firms above the median will also be matched to the same non-treated firms, the corresponding 
ATT estimate is reported in column 2 row 4. %Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) equals the change in the 
number of loans made by firms’ lead bank to all other firms between the periods October 2005-June 2006 & 
October 2006-June 2007 and the crisis period October 2008-June 2009. Lead bank refers to that in the 
borrower’s last pre-crisis lines of credit syndicate. Firms whose lead bank experienced a severe drop of bank 
lending will be categorized into Δ𝐿𝑖  Low group, while firms whose lead bank has a mild drop will be in Δ𝐿𝑖  
High group. ABX exposure is lead bank’s exposure to ABX AAA 2006-H1 index (ABX exposure data is 
from Chodorow-Reich’s website). Firm level measures of Δ𝐿𝑖  and ABX exposure are the weighted average 
by bank allocation over the lead banks in the last pre-crisis syndicate. Heteroskedasticity consistent robust 
standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Lines of credit availability in the crisis and bank health for treated firms 
 Dependent: firms obtaining new credit lines in the crisis 
 Probit Probit OLS IV 
 
     ABX exposure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
%Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) 0.401*** 0.266** 0.076**     0.172** 
 (0.148) (0.133) (0.037) (0.073) 
Financial controls NO YES YES YES 
Industry NO YES YES YES 
Rating NO YES YES YES 
First stage F statistics   30.11 
Lead lender 1 cluster 23 23 23 23 
Lead lender 2 cluster 24 24 24 24 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Notes. This table reports the firm level regression of whether 94 treated firms obtained new credit lines in the 
crisis October 2008-June 2009 on their bank health measure Δ𝐿𝑖 . %Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) equals 
the change in the number of loans made by firms’ lead bank to all other firms between the periods October 
2005-June 2006 & October 2006-June 2007 and the crisis period October 2008-June 2009. ABX exposure is 
lead bank’s exposure to ABX AAA 2006-H1 index (ABX exposure data is from Chodorow-Reich’s website). 
Firm level measures of Δ𝐿𝑖  and ABX exposure are the weighted average by bank allocation over the lead 
banks in the last pre-crisis syndicate. Financial controls include Q, cash flow, cash, size (log of assets) and 
leverage. Industry is 1-digit SIC dummy, Rating are categorized into unrated, below-investment grade, and 
investment grade. Standard errors are two-way clustered on the lead lenders in the borrower’s last pre-crisis 
lines of credit syndicate, and are displayed in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 8. Investment comparisons with different matching variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Difference in differences –0.57*  –0.71** –0.50 –0.67** –0.64** –0.58* 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.33) 
Matching estimator –0.56** –0.72*** –0.51** –0.69** –0.70*** –0.45*** 
(Abadie-Imbens) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.28) (0.21) (0.17) 
       
Cash × × × × × × 
Cash flow  × × × × × 
Size   × × × × 
Leverage    × × × 
Q     × × 
Investment      × 
Ratings × × × × × × 
Industry × × × × × × 
Notes. This table compares the average quarterly investment (quarterly capital expenditures divided by 
lagged assets) from 2006Q4-2007Q2 to 2008Q4-2009Q2 by gradually adding matching variables. For 
example, column 1 matches on cash, ratings and industry, and column 6 uses all the matching variables 
(baseline matching). The treated firms (94 firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines became 
due in the crisis October 2008 to June 2009. The non-treated firms (835 firms) are defined as those whose 
last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled to mature after June 2009. Control firms are selected from the non-
treated group by matching on variables measured at the end of 2006. Robust standard errors clustered by 
firms are reported in parenthesis for the difference-in-differences estimates. Heteroskedasticity consistent 
robust standard errors are displayed in parenthesis for the matching ATT estimates. ***, **, * represents 
significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 9. Investment comparisons by the amount of maturing credit lines 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Treated: firms 
with maturing 
credit lines 
Treated: firms 
with maturing 
credit 
lines/assets>5% 
Treated: firms 
with maturing 
credit 
lines/assets>10% 
Treated: firms 
with maturing 
credit 
lines/assets>15% 
Difference in differences –0.58* –0.55 –0.66 –0.83  
(0.33) (0.39) (0.51) (0.64) 
Matching estimator –0.45*** –0.51*** –0.60*** –0.74** 
  (0.17) (0.20) (0.23) (0.30) 
Number of Treated firms 94 76 52 41 
Notes. This table compares the change in average quarterly investment from 2006Q4-2007Q2 to 2008Q4-
2009Q2 across treated and control firms. In column 1, the treated firms (94 firms) are defined as those whose 
last pre-crisis credit lines became due in the crisis (baseline). In column 2, 3, and 4, I require treated firms to 
have maturing credit lines over assets ratio greater than 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively. The non-treated 
firms (835 firms) are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines were scheduled to mature after June 
2009. Matched control firms are selected from the non-treated group based on Abadie-Imbens estimator using 
matching variables including size, cash flow, cash, Q, leverage, investment, 1-digit SIC, and credit ratings, 
all measured at the end of 2006. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parenthesis for the 
difference-in-differences estimates. Heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors are displayed in 
parenthesis for the matching ATT estimates. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively.  
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Table 10. Comparison of cash and other policies 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Cash Employment R&D 
Difference in differences 1.98* 0.80 0.00 
 
(1.11) (3.57) (0.09) 
Matching estimator 2.12** 0.79 0.00 
  (1.06) (3.39) (0.12) 
Notes. This table compares cash and other policies from 2006Q4-2007Q2 to 2008Q4-2009Q2 across treated 
and matched control firms. Cash is defined as quarterly cash divided by assets. Employment is defined as 
percentage change in the number of employees. R&D is defined as quarterly R&D expense over lagged assets 
to make it comparable with the definition of investment. In the DiD regressions, I regress outcome variables 
(change in cash, employment growth, change in R&D) on treated dummy and control variables used in 
matching. The treated firms are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines became due in the crisis 
October 2008 to June 2009. The non-treated firms are defined as those whose last pre-crisis credit lines were 
scheduled to mature after June 2009. Matched control firms are selected from the non-treated group based 
on Abadie-Imbens estimator using matching variables including size, cash flow, cash, Q, leverage, 
investment, 1-digit SIC, and credit ratings, all measured at the end of 2006. In column (1) and (2), there are 
94 treated firms and 88 unique control firms. For the comparison of R&D, I restrict the sample to firms with 
positive R&D expenditures in the normal period 2006Q4-2007Q2. There are 44 treated firms and 40 unique 
control firms in column (3). The unit is percentage point in column (1). Robust standard errors clustered by 
firms are reported in parenthesis for the difference-in-differences estimates. Heteroskedasticity consistent 
robust standard errors are displayed in parenthesis for the matching ATT estimates. ***, **, * represents 
significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 11. Test for exogeneity of bank health (firm-bank level regression) 
  Δ Log(lines of credit in firm-bank pair) 
 No firm FE effect firm FE effect No firm FE effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
% Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏) 1.16**      1.11***      1.16*** 
 (0.48) (0.41) (0.43) 
Size       1.71*** 
   (0.48) 
Cash flow          33.44*** 
   (10.76) 
Leverage   –4.84 
   (3.25) 
Cash   –5.83 
   (3.55) 
Q   –1.09 
   (0.79) 
Borrower FE NO Yes NO 
Rating FE Yes NO Yes 
Industry FE Yes NO Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.06 0.31 0.15 
Borrowers 94 94 94 
Banks 42 42 42 
Observations 695 695 695 
Notes. This sample includes firms that obtain new credit lines in the crisis October 2008-June 2009. I also 
require such firms’ last pre-crisis facility includes credit lines and has at least two lenders. The restrictions 
lead to 94 firms. The regression is at the loan level, so each bank-firm pair in a firm’s last pre-crisis syndicate 
is an observation. The dependent variable is the log change in the dollar amount of credit lines from that bank 
to the borrower. %Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏) equals the change in the number of loans made by 
firms’ bank b to all other firms between the periods October 2005-June 2006 & October 2006-June 2007 and 
the crisis period October 2008-June 2009. Δ𝐿−𝑖,𝑏  has been normalized so it has unit variance. Industry is 1-
digit SIC dummy. Rating are categorized into unrated, below-investment grade, and investment grade. All 
regressions in the table are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered on the last pre-crisis lender in 
column 2, and on the last pre-crisis lender and borrower in column 1 and 3. ***, **, * represents significance 
levels are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 12. The effect of bank liquidity supply on credit lines growth (firm-level regression) 
  Lines of credit growth rate 
 
OLS OLS IV 
(ABX exposure) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
%Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) 1.152***     0.897***   0.916** 
 (0.349) (0.306) (0.341) 
Financial variables No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-statistics   43.53 
Lead bank cluster 1 40 40 40 
Lead bank cluster 2 42 42 42 
Observations 1257 1257 1257 
Notes. This sample includes firms that had at least one facility before the crisis October 2008-June 2009. The 
restriction leads to 1257 firms. The regression is at the firm level. The dependent variable is the credit lines 
growth rate defined as the change in log (average lines of credit) from October 2006-June 2007 to the crisis 
period October 2008-June 2009.  credit lines amount is not extracted from 10-K or 10-Q, but it is constructed 
by aggregating all the outstanding credit lines facilities from Dealscan at a given point in time (Acharya et 
al., 2013). %Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) equals the change in the number of loans made by firms’ lead 
bank to all other firms between the periods October 2005-June 2006 & October 2006-June 2007 and the crisis 
period October 2008-June 2009. Δ𝐿𝑖  has been normalized, so it has unit variance. ABX exposure is the lead 
bank’s exposure to ABX AAA 2006-H1 index (ABX exposure data is from Chodorow-Reich’s website). 
Firm level measures of Δ𝐿𝑖  and ABX exposure are the weighted average by bank allocation over the lead 
banks in the last pre-crisis syndicate. Financial variables include size, cash flow, cash, Q, and leverage. 
Industry is 2-digit SIC. Ratings are categorized into unrated, below-investment grade, and investment grade. 
Standard errors are two-way clustered on the lead lenders in the borrower’s last pre-crisis syndicate and are 
displayed in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 13. The effect of bank liquidity supply on investment (firm-level regression) 
  Investment growth rate  
 
OLS OLS IV 
(ABX exposure) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
%Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖)     0.083** 0.082** 0.137*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.028) 
Financial variables No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-statistics   46.6 
Lead bank cluster 1 40 40 40 
Lead bank cluster 2 42 42 42 
Observations 1257 1257 1257 
Notes. This sample includes firms that have at least one facility before the crisis October 2008-June 2009. 
The restriction leads to 1257 firms. The regression is at the firm level. The dependent variable is the 
investment growth rate defined as the change in log(total quarterly capital expenditures) from October 2006-
June 2007 to the crisis period October 2008-June 2009. %Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) equals the change 
in the number of loans made by firms’ lead bank to all other firms between the periods October 2005-June 
2006 & October 2006-June 2007 and the crisis period October 2008-June 2009. Δ𝐿𝑖  has been normalized, so 
it has unit variance. ABX exposure is the lead bank’s exposure to ABX AAA 2006-H1 index (ABX exposure 
data is from Chodorow-Reich’s website). Firm level measures of Δ𝐿𝑖  and ABX exposure are the weighted 
average by bank allocation over the lead banks in the last pre-crisis syndicate. Financial variables include 
size, cash flow, cash, Q, and leverage. Industry is 2-digit SIC. Ratings are categorized into unrated, below-
investment grade, and investment grade. Standard errors are two-way clustered on the lead lenders in the 
borrower’s last pre-crisis syndicate and are displayed in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents significance levels 
are the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 14. The effect of bank liquidity supply on credit lines and investment by ratings 
 
Lines of credit  
growth rate 
Investment  
growth rate 
 (1) (2) 
%Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) * Unrated     1.068***      0.117** 
 (0.383) (0.050) 
%Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) * Rated 0.496 0.015 
 (0.309) (0.035) 
Financial controls Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Rating FE Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes 
Lead bank cluster 1 40 40 
Lead bank cluster 2 42 42 
Observations 1257 1257 
Notes. This sample includes firms that have at least one facility before crisis October 2008-June 2009. The 
restrictions lead to 1257 firms. The regression is at the firm level. The dependent variable in column 1 is the 
bank liquidity growth rate defined as the change in log (average lines of credit) from 2006:10-2007:6 to 
2008:10-2009:6. The dependent variable in column 2 is the investment growth rate defined as the change in 
log (total capital expenditures) from October 2006-June 2007 to 2008-June 2009. %Δ loans to other 
borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) equals the change in the number of loans made by firms’ lead bank to all other firms between 
the periods October 2005-June 2006 & October 2006-June 2007 and the crisis period October 2008-June 
2009. Δ𝐿𝑖  has been normalized, so it has unit variance. Firm level measures of Δ𝐿𝑖  are the weighted average 
by bank allocation over the lead banks in the last pre-crisis syndicate. Financial variables include size, cash 
flow, cash, Q, and leverage. Industry is 2-digit SIC. Rating are categorized into unrated, below-investment 
grade, and investment grade. Standard errors are two-way clustered on the lead lenders in the borrower’s last 
pre-crisis syndicate and are displayed in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 15. The effect of bank liquidity supply on choice between cash and credit lines 
 credit lines/(credit lines+cash) credit lines /net assets 
 OLS 
IV 
(ABX exposure) OLS 
IV 
(ABX exposure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
%Δ loans to  
other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) 0.030*** 0.039*** 0.021** 0.026*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-statistics  47.1  47.1 
Lead bank cluster 1 40 39 40 39 
Lead bank cluster 2 42 42 42 42 
Observations 1257 1257 1257 1257 
Notes. This sample includes firms that have at least one facility before crisis October 2008-June 2009. The 
restriction leads to 1257 firms. The regression is at the firm level. The dependent variable in column 1 – 2 is 
change in average credit lines /(credit lines+cash) from October 2006-June 2007 to the crisis period October 
2008-June 2009. The dependent variable in column 3 – 4 is change in average credit lines/net assets from 
October 2006-June 2007 to the crisis period October 2008-June 2009. %Δ loans to other borrowers (Δ𝐿𝑖) 
equals the change in the number of loans made by firms’ lead bank to all other firms between the periods 
October 2005-June 2006 & October 2006-June 2007 and the crisis period October 2008-June 2009. Δ𝐿𝑖  has 
been normalized, so it has unit variance. ABX exposure is lead bank’s exposure to ABX AAA 2006-H1 index 
(ABX exposure data is from Chodorow-Reich’s website). Financial variables include size, cash flow, Q, 
leverage, net worth ((assets – liabilities)/assets), and tangibility (tangible assets/total assets). Firm level 
measures of Δ𝐿𝑖  and ABX exposure are the weighted average by bank allocation over the lead banks in the 
last pre-crisis syndicate. Industry is 2-digit SIC. Ratings are categorized into unrated, below-investment grade, 
and investment grade. Standard errors are two-way clustered on the lead lenders in the borrower’s last pre-
crisis syndicate and are displayed in parenthesis. ***, **, * represents significance levels are the 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
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